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Using a Certificate Public Key to Protect DKIM Public Key Spoofing

Brand Indicators for Message Identification (BIMI) is a standard that allows domain
owners to coordinate with Mail User Agents (MUAs) (i.e., email clients) to display brandspecific indicators next to properly authenticated messages. The BIMI standard relies on the
domain name system (DNS) to specify policies and to assist with authenticating email along with
authentication protocols such as Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and
Conformance (DMARC), Sender Policy Framework (SPF), and DomainKeys Identified Mail
(DKIM). Brand Indicators for Message Identification describes to email services how to fetch
and authenticate a brand indicator (e.g., a logo) to display to a user to identify the sender of the
message. However, DNS is susceptible to several different spoofing attacks such as DNS cache
poisoning, Border Gateway Protocol (BPG) attacks, etc.
A Verified Mark Certificate (VMC), which is validated by a third party Certificate
Authority (CA), helps protect against spoofing attacks by including a proof mechanism to
validate, using public-key cryptography, each organization with their associated logo. However,
currently the entity certificate public key is not used as a signature. While DKIM (RFC6376)
and SPF (RFC7208) authenticate the email sender, they are both still susceptible to DNS attacks
and neither provides graphical logos to identify messages1. Additionally, Secure/Multipurpose
Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) (RFC5751) also authenticates email messages, but is not in
common use and also does not provide graphical logos to identify messages. Various propriety
solutions exist to provide logos, however these methods rely on the host company of the email
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See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5751 and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6376
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service to validate the logos which is problematic as it lacks scalability, lacks uniformity, and
poses a significant burden on the host company.2
This paper offers a profile that aligns the DKIM public key and the VMC end-entity
public key with each other (i.e., make them equivalent). Thus, if the DKIM DNS policy record
is spoofed or otherwise attacked, the email service may detect the attack and untrust the message
published via the spoofed DNS record. While the proposed profile still uses DKIM to perform
initial message validation, the profile also allows for DNS attacks to be exposed.

Certificate
Authority

Sends Message
with DKIM Public
Key Aligned with
VMC Public Key

User Device

User

Verifies
Organization's
Logo and Issues
VMC

Verifies Alignment/VMC
and Displays Logo with
Message

Email
Service

Email Sender
Organization

Figure 1

As illustrated in Figure 1 above, the CA validates and associates a logo with the email
sender organization and issues the email sender organization a VMC. This VMC is associated
with a public key created by the email sender organization (and to which the email sender
organization maintains the associated private key). The email sender organization, when sending
an email to a user, aligns the DKIM public key with the public key associated with the VMC.
That is, the email sender organization ensures that the DKIM public key matches (i.e., is the
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See, for example https://support.google.com/business/thread/1858263?hl=en and
https://partner.microsoft.com/en‐us/marketing/branding
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same) as the VMC public key. The email sender organization indicates this alignment via, for
example, a policy object identifier (OID).
The user’s email service receives the email from the email sender organization and, upon
detecting the feature via the policy OID, verifies the alignment of the VMC public key and the
DKIM public key. When the VMC public key and the DKIM public key are aligned (and the
VMC is properly authenticated), the email service provides the email to the user with the logo
displayed. When the VMC public key and the DKIM public key do not align (i.e., they are not
equal), the email service rejects authentication and refuses to display the logo with the message.
Additionally, the email service may impose additional penalties upon the message. For example,
the email service displays a warning along with the message or hides the message from the user
(e.g., places the message in a spam folder).
The solution described may be used for all messages sent using the BIMI standard. The
solution provides a use for the currently unused public key associated with a VMC and thus
requires minimal impact to current infrastructure. The use of a standard such as BIMI with the
proposed solution allows all domain owners interested in ensuring that their logos are displayed
correctly to publish brand logos for use with any participating MUA, thus offering more
flexibility and scalability than current proprietary solutions.
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ABSTRACT
Brand Indicators for Message Identification (BIMI) is a standard that allows domain
owners to coordinate with Mail User Agents (MUAs) to display brand-specific indicators or
logos next to properly authenticated messages. A Verified Mark Certificate allows an email
service to authenticate a logo, but currently BIMI is susceptible to DNS spoofing attacks. In this
work, BIMI messages are protected from DNS spoofing by aligning the message’s DomainKeys
Identified Mail (DKIM) public key with the public key associated with the VMC. The email
service may validate the alignment between the keys as part of the authentication of the message.
When the keys match, the email service may display the indicator or logo along with the
message. When the keys do not match, the email service may reject the authentication and not
display the logo or indicator.
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